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For the past thirty years, arguments over the proper representation
for children have been a focus of continuous academic debate. While the
academic debate rages, in the majority of states, attorneys serve in a
netherworld of unclear and conflicting standards.
One type of representation in particular focuses the terms of the
debate: the representation of an adolescent parent in child welfare
proceedings. Who are these child-clients? What are their rights to
representation? What are the challenges for those representatives?
This article will advocate for strongly child-directed and childcentered representation of these teen parents.
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I. THE CLIENTS—NOT YOUR MOVIE TEEN MOM
The United States of America has the highest adolescent pregnancy
and birth rates of any other industrialized nation.2 Each year, almost
750,000 women in the United States between the ages of fifteen and
nineteen become pregnant.3 Roughly 60% of these women give birth.4
“With the exception of a 2-year increase between 2005 and 2007, teenage
birth rates have declined each year since 1991.”5 In 2008, 141,428 girls
under the age of eighteen gave birth.6 About 4% of these mothers were
under the age of fifteen, 12% were age fifteen, 29% were age sixteen.7
Recent movie and television depictions of adolescent pregnancy
have painted these adolescent pregnancies as minor challenges in a
teenager’s life. The 2007 Academy Award-winning movie Juno8 and the
2009 Golden Globe Award-winning television show Glee9 both depicted
young, white, bright girls becoming pregnant after their first sexual
experience with a boy their own age. Both girls (Juno and Glee’s Quinn)
stay in high school through their pregnancy, and give their baby up for
adoption to a middle-class single mother whom they have met before the
baby is born.10 The teenage fathers are little more than observers to the
entire drama. The teen mothers return to their everyday high school life
without major changes in their life or even their outlook. In the news,
seventeen-year-old Bristol Palin’s pregnancy during her mother’s 2008 vicepresidential campaign provided only a slightly different picture because of
the more prominent role of the father, Levi Johnston.11 Yet, the experiences
of Juno, Quinn, and even Bristol bear little resemblance to the
2
Press Release, The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, US Teen Births Still
Highest Among Industrialized Nations (May 3, 2010), available at http://www.acog.org/from_home/
publications/press_releases/nr05-03-10-2.cfm.
3
Kathryn Kost et al., U.S. Teenage Pregnancies, Births and Abortions: National and State Trends
and Trends by Race and Ethnicity, GUTTMACHER INST., 2 (Jan. 2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
USTPtrends.pdf.
4
Id. 41.9 % of pregnancies among fifteen to nineteen-year-olds in 2006 ended in birth. Id.
5
T.J. MATHEWS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. HEALTH STATS., NO. 46, STATE DISPARITIES IN TEENAGE
BIRTH RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2010). The birthrate for teenage mothers ages fifteen to
nineteen in 2008 is approximately double that of teenage fathers: 41.5 per thousand for mothers and 19
per thousand for fathers. Joyce A. Martin et al., U.S. Dep. Health & Human Services, Births: Final Data
for 2008, 59 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS., 7, 16 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_01.pdf. Rates for Hispanic teenagers fell to historic lows. Id. at 8.
6
Joyce A. Martin et al., U.S. Dep. Health & Human Services, Births: Final Data for 2008, 59
NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS., 7 (2010). “Among teenagers under 20 years, the rate for ages ten to fourteen
was unchanged at 0.6 births per thousand. The number of births to this age group dropped 7% from 2007
to 2008, to 5,764, the fewest in more than half a century (5,316 in 1953).” Id.
7
A total of 440,522 births were to mothers ages ten to nineteen. Id. at Table 2. The numbers of
mothers by age were age fifteen (17,093); age sixteen (41,540); age seventeen (77,031); age eighteen
(125,010); and age nineteen (174,084). Id.
8
JUNO (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2007), available at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0467406/.
9
Glee: Preggers (20th Century Fox Television Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt1442937/.
10
JUNO, supra note 8; Glee, supra note 9.
11
Sarah Kershaw, Now, the Bad News on Teenage Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at G1.
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overwhelming majority of adolescent teen pregnancies.12
One of the most common characteristics of adolescent parents is
poverty.13 The poorer the young woman, the more likely she will become a
mother. Moreover, having a baby makes a poor teen poorer. Compared to
women of similar socio-economic status who postpone childbearing, teen
mothers are more likely to end up on public assistance. As with poverty,
below average educational achievement is both a precursor to and a
consequence of teen pregnancy.14 Teen mothers are substantially less likely
than women who delay childbearing to complete high school or obtain a
GED by the age of twenty-two (66% vs. 94%).15
Other demographic patterns predominate as well. Family structure
can influence the likelihood of teen parenting. For example, girls whose
sister, or mother and sister, were teen parents are more likely to be teen
parents themselves.16 The majority of teenage births are to Hispanic or
black mothers.17 Birth rates among black and Hispanic teenagers are
significantly higher than for non-Hispanic white teenagers.18 Thirteen
percent of births to teenagers are within marriage.19
Finally, one should recognize that not all of these pregnancies are
unwanted. Eighteen percent of teen pregnancies are planned.20 Most are
neither planned nor are they entirely the product of ignorance and accident,
but rather of what might be termed willful blindness to the risk of
pregnancy.21 Poverty, alienation from educational institutions, and lack of
low-skill, living wage jobs make early motherhood a choice with few
12

MTV has a reality series dedicated to depicting the lives of real-life pregnant teens. 16 and
Pregnant (11th Street Productions). The first season of the show led to a spin-off. Teen Mom (11th
Street Productions).
13
Douglas Kirby et al., Manifestations of Poverty and Birthrates Among Young Teenagers in
California Zip Code Areas, 33 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 67-68 (2001). Poverty appears to play a greater role
in both the African-American and Hispanic populations than in the white population. Id. at 63.
14
William P. O’Hare, Teen Childbearing in America’s Largest Cities 6-7 (Annie E. Casey Found.,
A Kids Count Working Paper, 1999), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED445174.pdf.
15
Kate Perper et al., Diploma Attainment Among Teen Mothers, CHILD TRENDS (Jan. 2010),
http://www.childtrends.org/Files/Child_Trends-2010_01_22_FS_DiplomaAttainment.pdf.
16
Patricia L. East et al., Association Between Adolescent Pregnancy and a Family History of
Teenage Births, 39 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 108, 113 (2007).
17
Martin, supra note 5, at Table 6. The number of births to mothers under the age of eighteen by
race in 2008 are 44,095 for white mothers, 36,797 for African-Americans, and 55,198 for Hispanics. Id.
18
Id. at Table 8. The birth rate for teenagers ages fifteen to nineteen in the United States for 2007
was 27.2 per 1,000 for non-Hispanic whites, 81.8 per 1,000 for Hispanics, and 64.2 per 1,000 for nonHispanic blacks. Id. Even after poverty, employment, and other community characteristics were
controlled for, race and ethnicity had a statistically significant, but very small, positive effect on teen
birthrates. Kirby, supra note 13, at 67.
19
Martin, supra note 5, at 16.
20
See Guttmacher Inst., In Brief: Facts on American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.pdf.
21
See JENNIFER J. FROST & SELENE OSLAK, GUTTMACHER INST., TEENAGERS’ PREGNANCY
INTENTIONS AND DECISIONS: A STUDY OF YOUNG WOMEN IN CALIFORNIA CHOOSING TO GIVE BIRTH 9
(1999). Approximately 32% of the participants intended to get pregnant, 25% did not care if they
became pregnant, and 43% had not intended to become pregnant. Id.
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perceived marginal costs. At one time, these young parents would have
married and begun family formation with some economic stability, but
without living wage opportunities for those without higher education and
without the vision and support for attaining that higher education, this model
of early family formation is not a successful strategy for these young
people.22
II. THE INTERVENTION OF JUVENILE COURTS
For many reasons, these teenage parents are more likely to have
their children come under the jurisdiction of the courts than other parents.
For very young mothers (those less than sixteen years old), the risks of
removal of their children by the abuse and neglect system for maltreatment
or neglect of their child—while they themselves are still children—is double
that of mothers ages twenty to twenty-one.23 Teen mothers between the
ages of eighteen and nineteen are one-third more likely to have a child put in
foster care and are nearly 40% more likely to have a case of abuse or neglect
reported against them than women who waited until age twenty or twentyone to have their first child.24
One group of adolescent parents—those who are themselves wards
of the court—are more likely to become teen parents than their peers.25
Nearly half (48%) of the nineteen-year-old girls that have been in foster care
have become pregnant at least once, compared to 20% of children not in
foster care.26 Nearly one-third (32%) have at least one child, compared to
12% of children not in foster care.27 Children born to parents who are in
foster care are not automatically considered wards of the court in the same
sense as their parents. Federal law provides strong incentives for states to
22

NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE,
THE CREATION OF CULTURE 167 (2010).

RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND

An inadvertent pregnancy, in communities in which they are the norm, poses little
deterrent to sexual activity; yet, numerous studies find that delays in childbearing,
even without marriage, increase mother and child prospects . . . Accordingly,
marriage promotion by itself is likely to be ineffective, and limiting sexual activity
in communities in which it is widespread is virtually impossible. Great attention
to family planning is the indispensible link, but it too is unlikely to be effective
absent more systematic support for education, comprehensive health care, and job
opportunities.
Id.

23
ROBERT M. GOER ET AL., KIDS HAVING KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
TEEN PREGNANCY 276 (Saul D. Hoffman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
24
Saul D. Hoffman, By The Numbers: The Public Costs of Teen Childbearing, THE NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, 14 (2006), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/
costs/pdf/report/ BTN_National_Report.pdf.
25
Eve Stotland & Cynthia Godsoe, The Legal Status of Pregnant and Parenting Youth in Foster
Care, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6-7 (2006) (“[D]ata demonstrates not just that a significant
number of foster youth are pregnant and parenting, but that the incidence of pregnancy and parenthood is
higher among foster youth than among their peers.”).
26
Lucy A. Bilaver & Mark E. Courtney, Science Says: Foster Care Youth, 27 THE NAT’L
CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.
org/resources/pdf/SS/SS27FosterCare.pdf.
27
Id.
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keep parent and child together in foster care.28 Nonetheless, these parents
are far more likely to have their children become wards and be removed.29
As one author observed:
In New York, and in other states, “voluntary” separation of
parenting wards from their children is frequently the result
of coercive measures; specifically young mothers have been
pushed into giving up their children because of a lack of
available services and funding. Foster care staff may
threaten removal of their children, coercing these mothers
into following strict rules and into not complaining about
inadequate care.30
These same pressures can cause teenagers to run away with their
infants rather than conform to these strict rules. Of course, this action is
likely to trigger immediate responses by the child welfare system, including
issuance of a capias to bring the teen into the physical custody of the court
and immediate removal of the infant.
Even without such drastic action by teen parents, however, they
may find their children removed under the guise of child protection. These
removals are often without legal process. As one researcher noted:
The majority of caseworkers in the foster care system were
terrified of being blamed for something happening to babies
of teen mothers, and thus they tended to take the babies and
put them in separate homes. They didn’t worry that this
was against the law, which permitted removal only in cases
of imminent risk. For them imminent risk was synonymous
with teenage mothers.31
It is not only teen parents in foster care who face this increased risk
of removal of their children. Teen parents are likely to have their parenting
scrutinized more carefully and be subjected to higher standards than that of
their adult counterparts. Teenage parents are more likely to interact with
individuals who are mandated reporters of abuse and neglect, and those
reporters may be more likely to assume that children of teen parents are at
risk simply by virtue of their parent’s youth.

28
See Stotland, supra note 25, at 10-11. (describing Title IV–E of the Social Security Act which
provides that “payments made by the state for the teen’s maintenance must include an additional amount
for the infant’s support” and if the state removes the infant from the teen parent, the state may not use
federal funds to support the infant unless these is a court order for the removal).
29
Id. at 6-7.
30
Rebecca Bonagura, Redefining the Baseline: Reasonable Efforts, Family Preservation, and
Parenting Foster Children in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 181-82 (2008).
31
BETSY KREBS & PAUL PITCOFF, BEYOND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM: THE FUTURE FOR TEENS 82
(2006).
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Mandated reporters in hospitals will be assessing a teen’s parenting
ability and behavior as part of their caregiving. Some laws encourage
physicians to involve others in the teen parent’s caregiving. In some states,
children do not have the right to access prenatal care without notification to
their parents. While thirty-six states and the District of Columbia do allow
some minors to consent to prenatal care, in thirteen of those states, doctors
can inform parents that their minor daughters are seeking or receiving
prenatal care, if the physician deems that to be in the best interest of the
minor.32 North Dakota is the only state in which minors must have parental
consent for most of their prenatal care.33 The regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)34 presume that parents are personal representatives of their
children, except if state law provides that minors do not need parental
consent for treatment.35
Minnesota has a unique law that requires that any birth to a teen
parent be reported to the county social services agency within three days of
the birth.36 The agency then contacts the teen parent to determine whether
she has a plan for herself and the child to address a range of issues,
including steps to “address personal or family problems or to facilitate the
personal growth and development and economic self-sufficiency of the
minor parent and child.”37 If a minor parent fails to plan—or follow her
plan—the statute authorizes the agency to file a protective supervision
action due to the “immaturity of the minor parent.”38 While other states may
32
Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Minor’s Access to Prenatal Care, (Mar. 1, 2011)
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MAPC.pdf.
33
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14–10–19 (2011) (providing that minors may obtain pregnancy testing and
pain management related to pregnancy without parental consent and may be provided prenatal care in the
first trimester; however, in the second and third trimesters the physician may provide only one visit
without parental consent or a determination that parents are unavailable).
34
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d–1(c)(2)(A)
(2010).
35
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(A) (2010).
36
MINN. STAT. § 257.33(2) (2007), described in Marie A. Failinger, Law and the Modern American
Family: Ophelia with Child: A Restorative Approach to Legal Decision-Making by Teen Mothers, 28
LAW & INEQ. 255, 258-64 (2010) (The statute is one of several laws relating to teen parent decisionmaking in Minnesota.).
37
MINN. STAT. § 257.33(2).
The plan must consider: (1) the age of the minor parent; (2) the involvement of the
minor’s parents or of other adults who provide active, ongoing guidance, support,
and supervision; (3) the involvement of the father of the minor’s child, including
steps being taken to establish paternity, if appropriate; (4) a decision of the minor
to keep and raise her child or place the child for adoption; (5) completion of high
school or GED; (6) current economic support of the minor parent and child and
plans for economic self-sufficiency; (7) parenting skills of the minor parent; (8)
living arrangement of the minor parent and child; (9) child care and transportation
needed for education, training, or employment; (10) ongoing health care; and (11)
other services as needed to address personal or family problems or to facilitate the
personal growth and development and economic self-sufficiency of the minor
parent and child.
Id.
38
MINN. STAT. § 257.33(2)(c).
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not mandate such a procedure, one might suspect that similar requirements
of planning and supervision arise less formally.
In most jurisdictions, a teen’s newborn would not be placed
automatically under jurisdiction of the state because the teen has not yet had
the opportunity for parenting, and there would be little basis for intervention
based on abuse and neglect. Nonetheless, additional scrutiny may come
from other adults in the teen parent’s life. A teen parent who stays in school
may have her parenting scrutinized on a daily basis by teachers, nurses, and
social workers in a way that an adult’s relationship with her children would
not be similarly monitored by her employers.
Moreover, just as with adult parents, poverty places teen parents at
increased risk of being charged with abuse and neglect.39 As poor teen
parents apply for governmental assistance for themselves and their children,
they may be subject to requirements for receiving that assistance that may
lead to charges of abuse and neglect. The United States Supreme Court in
Wyman v. James affirmed the right of states to condition welfare benefits
upon the recipients’ consent to periodic home visits by caseworkers.40
Welfare reform in recent decades has increased the use of these home visits
as means to investigate for fraud, but also to discourage applications for
government benefits.41
In addition to those teen parents who find their parental rights at
risk, 5% of teen birth mothers affirmatively relinquish their children for
adoption.42 The degree to which these mothers’ decisions are voluntary is
difficult to assess. Programs, parents, and even potential adoptive parents
may create subtle or overt pressures for voluntary relinquishment. These
processes of relinquishment are less visible, with less certain rights to
representation, than involuntary termination processes.
Whether a teen’s parenting is placed into legal question because she
is herself a ward of the state, the state initiates a separate dependency action
for her child, or the teen has decided to relinquish her child, the question
becomes what legal representation must be provided to these parents.

39

Erica Turcios, Remaining vs. Removal: Preventing Premature Removal when Poverty is Confused
with Neglect, 12 MICH. CHILD WELFARE L.J. 20, 23 (2009).
40
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971). But see Robert A. Burt, Forcing Protection on
Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1260 (1971)
(criticizing the decision as government intrusion of the privacy and decision-making capacities of
families).
41
Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and the Myth
of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 375-82 (2010).
42
How Many Women Place Their Children for Adoption?, NATIONAL ADOPTION INFORMATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://statistics.adoption.com/information/adoption-statistics-placing-children.html.
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III. THE ATTORNEYS—MULTIPLE ROUTES TO UNCERTAIN
REPRESENTATION
Once a teen parent becomes a respondent in an abuse and neglect
proceeding, or acts to voluntarily relinquish her child, who represents that
parent? Across the states and even within each state, several sources
provide for the teen parent’s right to representation, but each source
suggests a slightly different form of representation.
A. Representation of the Adolescent as a Child in the Abuse and Neglect
System
As a minor in the abuse and neglect system, the parent must have a
guardian ad litem (GAL) or other representative. The Federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires the states to provide a
GAL to represent the child’s best interests in every case of abuse or neglect
that results in a judicial proceeding.43 The statute does not alter the
requirement of representation simply because the child is the respondent
rather than the subject of such a proceeding.44 Accordingly, in all states and
the District of Columbia, statutes provide for representation, but there are
many variations on exactly what kind of representation is required.45
In many states, the representative does not actually represent the
child but is a GAL whose role is to serve as an officer of the court to
investigate the child’s situation, wishes, and interests, and recommend to the
court those steps that would serve the best interest of the child.46 Thirtynine states provide for GAL representation.47 Oregon requires the
appointment of a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA).48 In sixteen
of these states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands, the GAL
must be an attorney and is required to operate as a guardian of best interests
43

Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii)

(2006).
44

See id.
See Representing Children Worldwide, YALE LAW SCHOOL (2005), http://www.law.yale.edu/
rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/am_n/usa/usa.htm [hereinafter Representing Children] (providing information on
all fifty states’ practice with respect to the appointment of counsel for children in dependency cases
organized by state).
46
42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii).
47
See Representing Children, supra note 45 (http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/
am_n/usa/usa.htm (click on the hyperlink of each state; then, in the address bar, change the end of the
URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable document version of the relevant
information) (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico (for a child under age fourteen; an attorney
must be appointed for a child who is age fourteen or older), North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). In Vermont, the GAL must advocate for the child’s
wishes if the child is able to effectively communicate them. Id. (follow the Vermont hyperlink; then, in
the address bar, change the end of the URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable
document version of the relevant information).
48
OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.170(1) (2009).
45
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rather than a client-directed advocate.49
Whether or not a GAL is an attorney, the role of GAL is one that
requires representation of the best interests of the child, and so leaves teen
parents with little effective say in how their position will be presented to a
court. In only seventeen states and Guam is the GAL even obligated to
communicate the child’s wishes to the court along with his or her own
recommendations.50 In ten states and Guam, the court may appoint a
separate counsel to represent the child if the child’s wishes conflict with the
GAL’s recommendations.51 However, this decision is a discretionary one
and courts are reluctant to appoint additional representation, even when a
child disagrees with her GAL’s recommendations.52
For example, in In re Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court held that in
the circumstances in which an older child consistently expressed wishes that
conflicted with her GAL’s recommendations, due process required that the
court conduct a hearing to determine whether independent counsel for the
child should be appointed.53 Even when children have expressed wishes
contrary to the GAL’s recommendations, the courts have sometimes
discounted that conflict because of the child’s age,54 maturity, mental
abilities,55 and psychological health.56 Most often, the courts discount this
conflict because the child expresses mixed emotions or desires,57 rather than
consistent, unequivocal, and repeated wishes that directly conflict with the
recommendations of the GAL.58 Given their general lack of power in adult49
Representing Children, supra note 45 (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
50
Id. (Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
51
Id. (Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Washington (if a child who is age 12 or older requests separate counsel), and Wisconsin).
52
See, e.g., In re Williams, 805 N.E.2d 1110, 1112-13 (Ohio 2004).
53
Id.
54
In re K.H., No. 5-10-06, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3226, at *27 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. Aug. 16, 2010)
(no representation required for four-year-old who did not speak much and did not express wishes to
GAL).
55
In re A.S., No. 05AP-351, 352, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4963, at **8 (Ct. App. 10th Dist. Oct. 18,
2005) (finding no error in failing to appoint counsel for child who was “low-functioning, has limited
communication abilities, and is unable to express her wishes as to custody[]”).
56
For example, in In re T.E., the court concluded that counsel for the children was not warranted
taking into account in particular the fact that the child who’s wishes conflicted with the GALs had “been
forced to act in a parental capacity in that home.” In re T.E., No. 22835, 2006 WL 173132, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2006).
57
In re Graham, 854 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2006) (No need for independent
representation of ten and eleven-year-old boys who “sometimes stated they wanted to be with their
mother, but also expressed conflicting emotions about where they wanted to be placed[]” when GAL
recommended against reunification).
58
See, e.g., In re M.C., No. L-09-1271, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1145, at **18-21 (Ct. App. 6th
Dist. Mar. 31, 2010) (finding no conflict requiring appointment of an attorney where a nine-year-old
expressed priority of choices for her custody and the GAL recommended foster care—the child’s third
choice); In re A.T., No. 23065, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3883, at **1, 31-32 (Ct. App. 9th Dist. Aug. 2,
2006) (finding statements of a nine-year-old child expressing a desire to be reunited with mother were
not sufficient to require independent representation because he did not have “the necessary maturity to
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child relationships, few children will have the disposition to express their
wishes so strongly and consistently.59 Thus, the fact that courts rarely find
the need for separate counsel should come as no surprise. Only a few states
require client-directed legal representation of the teen parent. Fifteen states
and Puerto Rico require the appointment of an attorney for the child.60 Five
states require both an attorney and GAL.61 In Wisconsin, a child has the
right to counsel and he or she may not be removed from the home unless
counsel has been appointed.62 If the child is under age twelve, the court may
appoint a GAL instead of counsel.63
In summary, teen parents who are represented by GALs will often
have very limited representation of their expressed wishes. In most systems,
the GAL represents the court’s interest in determining the best interest of the
child, rather than the child’s wishes. Moreover, funding, training, and
caseload burdens create significant limitations on the abilities of GALs to

understand the proceedings and provide a credible indication regarding his wishes as to custody”, he was
“in counseling and under psychiatric care” and he did not “consistently and repeatedly express[] a desire”
for reunification with mother when the GAL recommended permanent custody with the state for the five
siblings she represented).
59
William A. Kell, Symposium: Law and the New American Family: Response: Voices Lost and
Found: Training Ethical Lawyers for Children, 73 IND. L.J. 635, 646 (1998) (“Because she has learned
that what she thinks and what she says matters little, the child is reluctant to speak her mind, often out of
a sense that it would be a ‘waste of time.’”).
60
Representing Children, supra note 45 (click on the hyperlink of each state; then, in the address
bar, change the end of the URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable document version
of the relevant information) (California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New York, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Washington, and
Wyoming). In Connecticut and Wyoming, the attorney also may serve as the child’s GAL. Id. (follow
the Connecticut and Wyoming hyperlinks; then, in the address bar, change the end of the URL from
“htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable document version of the relevant information). In
Nevada, an attorney is required only under certain circumstances. Id. (follow the Nevada hyperlink; then,
in the address bar, change the end of the URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable
document version of the relevant information). In New Mexico, an attorney is required if the child is
fourteen or older. Id. (follow the New Mexico hyperlink; then, in the address bar, change the end of the
URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable document version of the relevant
information). In Washington, an attorney is required if the child is over twelve years old and requests an
attorney. Id. (follow the Washington hyperlink; then, in the address bar, change the end of the URL from
“htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable document version of the relevant information). In
California, the appointment of an attorney is required; however, if the court finds the child would not
benefit from an attorney the court must appoint a CASA for the child. Id. (follow the California
hyperlink; then, in the address bar, change the end of the URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order to find an
Adobe portable document version of the relevant information). Id.
61
Id. (click on the hyperlink of each state; then, in the address bar, change the end of the URL from
“htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable document version of the relevant information)
(Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Vermont). In Texas, the attorney may serve in
the dual role of attorney and GAL, or a separate GAL may be appointed. Id. (follow the Texas hyperlink;
then, in the address bar, change the end of the URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe
portable document version of the relevant information). In North Carolina and Mississippi, an attorney
must also be appointed if the court appoints a non-attorney GAL. Id. (follow the North Carolina and
Mississippi hyperlinks; then, in the address bar, change the end of the URL from “htm” to “pdf” in order
to find an Adobe portable document version of the relevant information).
62
Id. (follow the Wisconsin hyperlink; then, in the address bar, change the end of the URL from
“htm” to “pdf” in order to find an Adobe portable document version of the relevant information).
63
Id.
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provide zealous representation of these children.64
B. Representation of Minor Parents as Parents
In addition to requirements that GALs or attorneys represent teen
parents (or more commonly their best interests) as children in abuse and
neglect actions, in most states these teen parents may have some rights to
representation as parents as well. In Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services,65 the United States Supreme Court faced the question of whether
an indigent parent facing a possible termination of her parental rights had a
right to appointed counsel. The Court held that there was no absolute right
to counsel in these types of cases.66 Rather, the Court concluded that due
process might, in an individual case, require appointed counsel and that the
decision must be made on a case-by-case basis.67
The right to counsel is determined by applying the three-part due
process calculus of Matthews v. Eldridge,68 in which the court weighs the
state’s interest against the private interest implicated and the risk of
erroneous decision. The Court in Lassiter required that this balance operate
in the context of a presumption against the right to counsel absent a threat to
physical liberty.69 Thus, indigent parents and children in the federal courts
must establish their right to counsel on a case-by-case basis.70
When one evaluates due process in instances in which teen parents
are facing termination of their parental rights, the weight of the argument
favors a right to representation. Children need legal counsel when making
the decision to relinquish their infant or when facing termination of parental
rights. First, the cost of error is profound. Termination of parental rights
has been characterized as “the death penalty” of family law.71 For teen
parents, that loss is not less than when adults have their parental rights
terminated. A relinquishment is not cost free to any parent. Research
presents “a growing body of recent research data which has supported the
claims of birth parents that relinquishing a child is indeed a profound loss

64

See Barbara Glesner Fines, Pressures Toward Mediocrity in the Representation of Children, 37
CAP. U. L. REV. 411, 448 (2008).
65
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
66
Id. at 31-32.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
69
Id. at 26-27.
70
See, e.g., Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965).
71
In re Interest of K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004). “The termination of parental rights has
been characterized as tantamount to a civil death penalty . . . [i]t is a drastic intrusion into the sacred
parent-child relationship.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accord In re N.R.C., 94
S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. Ct. App. 14th Dist. 2002); In re Parental Rights as to K.D.L., 118 Nev. 737, 58
P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002); In re Interest of P.C., 62 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2001).
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experience, and that this loss even can have long-term deleterious results.”72
These negative effects can be mitigated with “sufficient resources and
support to make an informed and deliberate choice.”73 One can presume
that the loss is equal if not more profound when the parent has her rights
terminated. For teen parents, the loss and grief of relinquishing or losing a
child is aggravated by the circumstances of fewer resources to make these
decisions and less emotional maturity to cope with the emotional fallout.
Second, there is a high risk of this profound error. As the Montana
Supreme Court observed in recognizing a constitutional right to
representation for indigent parents in termination proceedings:
The potential for unfairness is especially likely when an
indigent parent is involved. Indigent parents often have a
limited education and are unfamiliar with legal proceedings.
If an indigent parent is unrepresented at the termination
proceedings, the risk is substantial that the parent will lose
her child due to intimidation, inarticulateness, or
confusion.74
If providing counsel to indigent parents with limited education is
necessary to guarantee due process for adults facing termination of their
parental rights, how much more so is this representation necessary for minor
parents? In Roper v Simmons,75 the United States Supreme Court held that
subjecting juveniles to the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.
The Court justified its decision on the basis that teenagers are less culpable
than their adult counterparts because they typically had not developed a
mature sense of decision-making and were more often impulsive and subject
to peer pressure.76 If teenagers are less culpable in the criminal setting, it
stands to reason that they should not be as easily judged with the finality of
termination of parental rights in the child welfare system without legal
representation. Moreover, their decision to consent to a voluntary
termination is less stable if made without the advice of a legal
representative. As one court noted:
Where the minor parent’s own parent or guardian is not
involved with the adoption, the minimum safeguard for
protecting the minor parent’s rights is independent legal
counsel. A guardian ad litem should be appointed by the
court where the minor is unable to secure such counsel. The
72
Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to the Adoption
of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 529 (2005) (quoting ROBIN C. WINKLER ET AL.,
CLINICAL PRACTICE IN ADOPTION 48 (1988)).
73
Id. at 530.
74
In re A.S.A, 258 Mont. 194, 198 (Mont. 1993).
75
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
76
Id. at 570.
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relatively insignificant delay and expense involved in
appointing a guardian ad litem should not outweigh the
importance of ensuring that the minor parent understands
the irrevocable nature of the proceedings.77
The right to counsel profoundly affects the outcome in child welfare
cases. Studies have demonstrated dramatically improved outcomes when
lawyers are guaranteed to parents in child welfare proceedings. Those
outcomes include reunification rates increasing by over 50%, termination of
rights decreasing by 45%, foster children aging out of the system decreasing
by 50%, and significantly shorter periods of time for children in foster
care.78 If these are the improved outcomes that result from providing
counsel to parents in all child welfare cases, surely these results would be
even truer within the subset of parents who are minors, where the need for
guidance, empowerment, trust, and engagement is so much greater. These
studies suggest that, without the right to counsel, many more families are
disrupted for much greater periods of time than is necessary to serve the
purposes of the child protection system. In terms of due process analysis,
the risks and costs of error are both very high.
Third, ordinarily in a due process calculus, the risks of erroneous
deprivation of private rights must be balanced against the government’s
“significant interests in informality, flexibility, and economy.”79 This
presumes that the absence of counsel reduces costs and increases efficiency.
With the child welfare system, however, much of the fiscal cost of error is
borne by the state. From the costs of the termination proceeding itself, to
the costs of foster care and placement proceedings, avoiding erroneous
termination of parental rights actually reduces costs. Studies indicate that
when parents have the right to counsel, hearings take place faster and the
savings to governments are millions of dollars over short periods of time.80
Most states have agreed with the due process analysis and provide
broader protection for these litigants than Lassiter mandated. A number of
states have established a constitutional right to counsel for parents in
dependency cases, though most provide counsel only at the termination of
the parental rights stage, rather than at the earlier dependency action
proceedings.81 Other states prefer to provide the right by statute or court
77

See In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690, 713 (Miss. 2003).
Vivek S. Sankaran, A Hidden Crisis: The Need to Strengthen Representation of Parents in Child
Protective Proceeding, 89 MICH. B. J. 36, 38 (2010).
79
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
80
Vivek S. Sankaran, Protecting a Parent’s Right to Counsel in Child Welfare Cases, 13 MICH.
CHILD WELFARE J. 2, 3 (2009).
81
Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska 1979) (“[D]ue process requires the state to appoint
counsel whenever an indigent parent, unable to present his or her case properly, faces a substantial
possibility of the loss of custody or of prolonged separation from a child.”); J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children
& Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1068 (Fla. 2000) (holding due process under the Florida Constitution
requires right to counsel in proceeding to terminate parental rights); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 401
78
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rule.82 Once granted, however, the right is protected by due process. In
cases brought in these states, the court may not decline to recognize the
right, as the legislature has preempted the court’s balancing test.83 Rather,
the issue is more often whether the litigant’s waiver of counsel is valid,84 or
whether effective assistance of counsel has been rendered.85
For example, in Missouri, in termination of parental rights cases,
indigent parents have a right to appointed counsel86 as do parents whose
children are the subject of less drastic dependency proceedings.87 In some
instances, as when a parent is a minor or incompetent, the parents have the

N.W.2d 65, 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the right to counsel in termination proceedings is
guaranteed by state statute and also by the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan
Constitutions); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1993) (holding due process under the Montana
Constitution requires effective assistance of counsel in termination proceedings); In re Shelby R., 804
A.2d 435, 439-40 (N.H. 2002) (holding that due process requires appointment of counsel to stepparents
accused of abuse or neglect); Adoption of Holly, 738 N.E.2d 1115, 1121 (Mass. 2000) (finding state
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel for parents in termination of parental rights cases);
Danforth v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973) (holding that due process
requires appointment of counsel to indigent parents in child neglect cases); In re D.D.F v. State ex rel.
Dep’t. of Human Servs., 801 P.2d 703, 706-07 (Okla. 1990) (reaffirming, under the Oklahoma
Constitution, that due process requires appointed counsel in all termination cases); Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs. v. Moseley (In re Moseley), 660 P.2d 315, 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the
Washington Constitution requires effective assistance of counsel in termination proceedings); Patricia C.
Kussmann, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceedings for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, 92 A.L.R. 5th 379 (2011).
82
See, e.g., Ward v. Jones, 757 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (N.Y. 2003) (no right to counsel for parents
seeking visitation); K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 771 So. 2d 907, 914 (Miss.
2000) (no constitutional right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings).
83
Battishill v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 82 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (Arkansas
statutes providing for right to counsel in abuse and neglect proceedings creates due process right in all
cases).
84
In re Welfare of G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d 718, 722 (Minn. 2000).
85
See In re Interest of K.L., 91 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. App. 2d Dist. 2002); In re Interest of M.P.W.,
983 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1999).
86
MO. REV. STAT. § 211.462 (2003) (requiring appointment of guardian ad litem and providing
right to counsel to parent or guardian in proceedings to terminate parental rights). The statute does not
establish an absolute right to counsel. Id. at § 211.462(2). Instead, it requires the court to appoint
counsel only when: (1) the parent requests court-appointed counsel; and (2) the parent demonstrates that
he or she is indigent and therefore is financially unable to employ counsel. Id. The Missouri court has
held that, because of the severe nature of termination proceedings, the terms of § 211.462.2 are to be
strictly applied, and a court’s failure to appoint counsel without an affirmative waiver of those rights “has
been held to be a reversible error.” J.D. v. L.D., 34 S.W.3d 432, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2000). See
generally Kussmann, supra note 81, at 379 (discussing rights to appointed counsel of indigent parents in
various states).
87
MO. REV. STAT. § 211.211(1) (2003). The statute provides that “[a] party is entitled to be
represented by counsel in all proceedings.” Id.
This would include, then, proceedings to bring children under the [jurisdiction] of
the state as the result of abuse, neglect, or incapacity of parents. These
dependency proceedings do not necessarily result in termination of parental
rights[,] if services can be provided to reunify the family under conditions in
which the child’s health and safety are assured. These statutory rights to
representation are mandated by the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA) as a condition of federal funding.
Barbara Glesner Fines, Almost Pro Bono: Judicial Appointments of Attorneys in Juvenile and
Child Dependency Actions, 72 UMKC L. REV. 337, 343 n.41 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 5106c(b)(1)
(2006).
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right to a GAL as well.88 Even if a child has the right to an attorney to
provide client-directed representation, a GAL may nonetheless be
appointed. This appointment may result from the attorney’s request for a
GAL if the attorney believes a client is incompetent to direct the
representation, but more often, the court will appoint the GAL under the
assumption of incapacity. The resulting confusion of roles and authority can
undermine effective representation by either or both of these attorneys.
C. Counsel in Voluntary Relinquishment
When the context shifts to a voluntary relinquishment, the same
uncertainty of representation exists. In some states, a minor parent must be
provided with separate counsel prior to the execution of consent, or a GAL
must be appointed to either review or execute the consent.89 In three
states,90 Guam,91 and Puerto Rico,92 the consent of the minor’s parents must
be obtained. In two states, consent must be of either the teenager’s parents
or a GAL.93 In other states, a minor parent has no particular procedural
protections and statutes provide that their consent is valid, regardless of their
minority.94
Here again, the uncertainty of an attorney’s role even within these
states is profound. Is the role of an attorney in a teenager’s voluntary
relinquishment simply to ensure that the relinquishment is procedurally and
substantively sound or is it to engage the teenager in thinking through the
issue of relinquishment in order to ensure that the decision is truly informed
and voluntary? How does that differ from the role of a GAL in this same
setting?
88
MO. REV. STAT. § 211.462(2). “When the parent is a minor or incompetent the court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent such parent.” Id.
The statute provides little guidance on the issue of what constitutes ‘incompetence’
in a parent requiring the appointment of a GAL. Since common bases for
termination of parental rights actions are the mental condition or chemical
addiction of the parent, a low threshold for incompetency could result in the
necessity of both attorney and guardian ad litem for a large number of parents.
The issue is open, however, as the Missouri courts have not yet spoken on the
question.
Fines, supra note 87, at 343 n.42.
89
ALA. CODE §§ 26–10A–7, 26–10A–8 (2009) (GAL); ARK. CODE § 9–9–208 (2009) (GAL);
KAN. STAT. §§ 59–2114, 59–2115 (2005) (independent legal counsel); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.500 (2006)
(GAL); MD. CODE, FAM. LAW § 5–339 (2006) (counsel); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 453.030, 453.030(12)
(2003) (attorney/ legal representation); MONT. CODE §§ 42–2–303, 42–2–405, 42–2–408 (2009)
(separate legal counsel); TENN. CODE §§ 36–1–110, 36–1–117 (2009) (GAL “if deemed necessary”); W.
VA. CODE §§ 48–22–302, 48–22–304 (2002) (GAL).
90
LA. CHILD. CODE arts. 1193, 1113 (2010) (requiring that unless the minor parent has been
judicially emancipated or emancipated by marriage); MINN. STAT. § 259.24(2) (2007) (requiring that the
agency overseeing the adoption proceedings shall ensure that the minor parent is offered the opportunity
to consult with an attorney, a member of the clergy, or a physician before consenting to adoption of the
child); N. H. REV. STAT. § 170–B:5 (2010) (permitting courts to require assent of the parents).
91
19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 4206 (2010).
92
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 535 (2008).
93
R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15–7–5, 15–7–10 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.43 (2010).
94
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8–206(A)–(B) (2007).
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As the next section explores, whether the attorney is acting as an
attorney or a GAL, for the teenager as a child or a parent, in termination or
relinquishment actions, confusion and ambiguities abound.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF GOOD LAWYERING FOR A MINOR PARENT
An attorney representing an adolescent parent client owes that client
the same duties as an adult client.95 To serve these clients, however, the
attorney must overcome challenges of the ambiguity of the attorney’s role,
the uncertainty of the client’s legal rights, the questions of the capacity of
the child to direct the representation, the role and influence of other parties
in these disputes, and the systemic and personal biases present in
representing teen parents.
A. Confused and Conflicting Roles
As a preliminary matter, one of the most significant challenges to
attorneys representing teen parents is to clarify their role. The role of an
attorney for the child is difficult but at least better defined than that of an
attorney GAL. Rule 1.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides that the client is to direct the objectives of the representation96 and
Rule 1.4 provides that the attorney shall keep clients reasonably informed,
consult with them about the means of accomplishing their objectives, and
provide sufficient information for the client to provide informed consent to
those issues within the client’s control.97 Rule 1.14 acknowledges that some
clients may have limited capacity for this decision-making. However, the
rule makes clear that the attorney in these circumstances must “as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a conventional relationship with the client.”98
The role of the GAL is less certain, with duties that range from
advocacy for the child’s wishes, advocacy for the child’s best interest, and a
quasi-judicial role as the “eyes and ears of the court.”99 Attorneys who
95

Marvin V. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 267 (1995).
96
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010).
97
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.0(e) (defining informed consent).
98
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a).
99
Fines, supra note 64, at 441. Previously, I argued that the GAL role is commonly neither
advocacy for the best interests of the child nor for the child’s wishes but is more often a quasi-judicial
role:
The problem with this conception is that the role of judicial agent and the role of
attorney are quite opposite in many respects. Judges are required to be neutral,
disinterested and passive; attorneys represent a particular client’s objectives with
“warm zeal.” While the ethical conflict of advocating for the child’s interest as
opposed to the child’s wishes can be resolved by a clear identification of the client,
it is more difficult to reconcile the roles of the attorney (whether for the child or
the child’s best interest) and agent of the court. The attorney must refrain from
acting as a witness in the case, yet an agent of the court is expected to be the “eyes
and ears of the court,” investigating facts and preparing reports, testifying to facts
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regularly serve as GALs likely have a better sense of which of these roles
their particular judges perceive as appropriate, but those understandings can
be upset when translated into the unique setting of representing a child who
is a parent. Since most GALs are primarily child advocates, it is difficult for
some to keep their focus on representing the parent rather than concerning
themselves with what would be good for the teen’s infant. As one observer
noted in discussing the attitude toward foster care teen parents: “Now that
she has a child, the same system that cast the ward as a helpless victim is
quick to cast her as the enemy.”100 Even if they do not truly overlook their
client’s needs and wishes, the habits or practice of those who regularly
represent the best interest of children as children, rather than as parents, may
be to conflate both interests into a “what’s good for baby is good for
mommy” philosophy that leaves the child-parent without effective
representation.
To add to the confusion, as the previous section has discussed, in
many cases a teenage parent will have both a GAL and an attorney. Who is
in charge of decisions if there is both a GAL and an attorney for the child?
May the GAL direct the attorney’s representation? The answers to these
questions are rarely clear in the law or even as a matter of common
understandings among the attorneys in any given jurisdiction. However,
logic dictates that there is little purpose in having a second attorney to
represent the child’s expressed wishes when they conflict with the GAL’s
recommendations if the GAL has the power to direct that attorney’s
representation. Nonetheless, courts faced with the issue have hedged with
best interest and fact-specific decisions on this issue rather than clarifying
the role.
For example, the Connecticut Court of Appeals addressed this
confusion in a case in which the issue was custody of an infant born to an
eleven-year-old girl who had been sexually assaulted by her grandfather.101
The young mother was appointed both an attorney and an attorney GAL.102
The court considered the GAL appointment to be discretionary, finding that
the requirement of a GAL for a child in an abuse and neglect proceeding
only applied to cases when the child was the object of a petition, not a
and providing recommendations to the court. There are parallels of course. Both
attorneys and court investigators bring facts to the court’s attention, but with
attorneys those facts are selected and advocated so as to represent the client’s
objective. Not so with judicial agents, whose presentation of facts is expected to
be catholic and neutral. Attorneys advocate for results from a position of
partisanship; judicial agents recommend results from a position of disinterested
neutrality. Attorneys are held accountable to their clients; judicial agents are
accountable only to the judges.
Id.

100
101
102
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parent who also happens to be a child.103 When both the attorney and the
GAL recommended that the infant be placed in temporary custody of the
state, the grandmother appealed, arguing that she should have been the
person to speak on behalf of her daughter rather than the GAL.104 In
resolving this standing question, the court attempted to bring some clarity to
the respective roles of the GAL and attorney.105 The court considered the
duties of the GAL as suggested by the National Court Appointed Special
Advocate Association (NCASAA) and the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML), both of which deemphasize the role of the
GAL as a legal representative in any capacity. While refusing to adopt a
bright-line rule, the court’s discussion suggested some distinctions between
the GAL and the attorney for the child:
While the best interest of a child encompasses a catholic
concern with the child’s human needs regarding his or her
psychological, emotional, and physical well-being, the
representation of a child’s legal interests requires vigilance
over the child’s legal rights. Those legal rights have been
enumerated as the right to be a party to a legal proceeding,
the right to be heard at that hearing and the right to be
represented by a lawyer. When both a guardian ad litem
and an attorney have been appointed for a child, their
respective roles and the duties attendant to those roles
should adhere to that basic distinction. Specifically, the
guardian ad litem should refrain from acting as a second
attorney for the child.106
However, even with this clarification, the court recognized that,
especially in the context of cases in which there is both a GAL and an
attorney for the child, the only realistic source of clarity is in “precise, clearcut orders by the court after input from counsel.”107 Those orders should
address issues such as confidentiality, access to information, required
reporting to the court, as well as the degree to which the GAL or the child
should direct the representation.
B. The Client’s Rights
The first task of the teen parent’s attorney should be to ensure that
the child’s procedural and substantive rights are protected. However, the
teen parent’s rights are complicated by the unclear legal status of minors. In
103

Id. at 802 n.7.
Id. at 799-800.
105
Id. at 804 n.11 (“Given the unfortunate reality, however, that the status of being a child as well as
a parent in a juvenile proceeding is not a rarity, we believe a discussion of the respective responsibilities
of counsel and guardian ad litem for a child, here, is equally germane.”)
106
Id. at 806.
107
Id. at 807 n.20 (quoting 43 C.J.S. 609, Infants § 234 (1999)).
104
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some jurisdictions, becoming a parent results in emancipation; in most it
does not.108 The rights of adolescents vary widely depending on the
circumstances. Adolescents clearly do not have the same legal powers as
adults—whether the question is driving a car, entering into a contract,
voting, or serving in the military. When the question is the right of the child
in matters of intimacy and reproduction, the status of a teenager’s rights are
even more unclear. As several commentators have noted, adolescents
cannot access birth control or medical care, cannot choose to have an
abortion, and cannot enter into marriage with the same rights and freedoms
as adults. Yet, the adolescent appears to have an unlimited legal right to
conceive, bear, and raise a child.109
The right to parent is a fundamental constitutional interest. The
United States Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville most recently affirmed a
parent’s substantive due process right to parent their children, even as
against the interests of grandparents.110 To terminate those rights, due
process requires clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for
termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the child.111
However, judicial proceedings prior to termination have fewer protections
and lower standards of proof. The standard of proof for temporary removal
hearings is probable cause in most states and the standard for civil
adjudicatory hearings is the preponderance of the evidence standard.112
Just as the standard of proof varies at differing stages of the process,
so the standards for intervention may vary. Across jurisdictions, definitions
of abuse or neglect vary, but all require at a minimum some action, harm, or
behavior that has harmed or poses an “imminent risk of serious harm” to a
child.113 As a practical matter, however, the line between abuse, neglect,
and merely bad parenting becomes blurred once the state is involved.
Even though the standard for bringing a child into the jurisdiction of
the court may be clear, once the child is within the court’s jurisdiction, the
bar often is subtly raised. Whether they are not attending to the line or
whether they want to ensure that a reunified family does not again fall below
the line, child welfare agencies may provide services to promote the best
interest of the child that are not absolutely necessary to bring the family
108
E.g., Purdy v. Purdy, 578 S.E.2d 30, 31-32 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (no emancipation); Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 579 So. 2d 543, 549 (Miss. 1991) (finding no emancipation occurred because of lack of a good
relationship with noncustodial parent).
109
Emily Buss, Legal Issues Facing Adolescents And Teens: The Parental Rights of Minors, 48
BUFF. L. REV. 785, 811 (2000); Failinger, supra note 36, at 257.
110
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73, 75 (2000).
111
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982).
112
See, e.g., Jamison v. State, 218 S.W.3d 399, 417 (Mo. 2007) (holding that provisions of the abuse
and neglect laws requiring inclusion of an individual in the central registry before there had been a
finding of abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence by the Child Abuse and Neglect Review
Board violated due process).
113
42 U.S.C. § 5106g(2) (2006).
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above the line of abuse and neglect. In part, this is due to the world view of
social workers and other child protection agents in child welfare agencies.
Social workers and mental health professionals will be interested in broad
system perspectives, and will work toward improved relationships,
competencies, and outcomes over a longer period of time. Attorneys for the
children are assessing a particular set of events and behaviors in the context
of rules of evidence and specific legal standards.114 Releasing a child from
jurisdiction as soon as the legal standards are met may appear to a social
worker as particularly short-sighted and counterproductive when, with more
intervention or services, the family will be less likely to re-enter the system
at a later date. However, this systemic and preventative perspective is not
the law. The court may not take or keep jurisdiction of a child simply
because the family can “be better.” Attorneys for teen parents must
advocate for the legal right of the teens to be free from unwanted state
intervention. This advocacy does not prevent the attorney from also helping
the client to locate and access resources that can help improve the situation
of both the teen parent and the child.
Most importantly, in the risk calculus used to determine whether
intervention is appropriate,115 attorneys should ensure that risks are
calculated based on their client’s individual circumstances rather than broad
generalizations regarding the status of the child. Just as poverty should not
be confused with neglect, so too a parent’s youth should not be taken as
synonymous with an imminent risk of harm to their child. Youth of the
parent is a double-edged sword in child dependency actions.116 A parent’s
immaturity makes it difficult to conclude that the conditions that brought
their child into the court’s jurisdiction are ones that could be treated and
resolved. Courts have acknowledged that age and maturity may be taken
into account. However, courts also have held that age and immaturity do
not by themselves excuse a parent from the responsibility to meet the needs
of the child.117 What advocates for young parents must take care to prevent
is the assumption that youth and immaturity are themselves evidence of
unfitness. As the Kentucky Supreme Court observed:
A minor may be ill-equipped to parent simply by virtue of
his or her immaturity. Nevertheless, age and immaturity
114
Mary Kay Kisthardt, Working in the Best Interest of Children: Facilitating the Collaboration of
Lawyers and Social Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 34-35 (2006).
115
CHARMAINE BRITTAIN & DEBORAH ESQUIBEL HUNT, HELPING IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES:
A COMPETENCY-BASED CASEWORK HANDBOOK 219-24 (2d ed. 2004). Most child welfare agencies use
a risk assessment as part of the overall assessment process in determining appropriate services to provide
to a family. Id.
116
Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance
in the Law’s View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 95-98 (1999).
117
Commonwealth v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Ky. 2010) (citing T.N.H. v. J.L.H., No. 2006CA-001288-ME & No. 2006-CA-001736-ME, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 325, at *35 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31,
2007)).
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cannot excuse a parent from his or her responsibility to meet
. . . the basic needs of the child . . . . “Adulthood is not a
guarantee of parenting skills that meet even the minimum
required under the law. The age of majority holds no
magical formula to transform a mother who for years has
refused to take her role as a mother seriously.”118
Just as adulthood is no guarantee of maturity and fit parenting, so
too, attorneys should guard against the assumption that a parent’s minority
is accompanied by immaturity that makes the child categorically unfit as a
parent.
C. The Capacity of a Teen to Direct the Representation
In states in which attorneys are appointed as GALs rather than as
attorneys for the child, to what extent may the attorney treat the
representation as client-directed representation rather than best interest
determination? When representing adolescent parents, is it appropriate for
an attorney GAL to conclude that the best interest of the child-parent is
served by providing client-directed representation? Teen parents, even more
than other children involved in the child welfare system, need to have a
voice in the process and to be spared the most negative psychological and
legal consequences of a termination in which they were not empowered to
make decisions about the representation. When these same teenagers are the
subjects of custody or adoption actions, courts consider their preferences,
especially the choices of older teenagers.119 Likewise, the consent of
adolescents is generally required for their adoption.120 Concluding that an
adolescent parent cannot direct the representation contributes to the overall
conclusion of incapacity or unfitness. After all, if a teen cannot direct their
representation with the assistance and counsel of their attorney, how can that
same teen make decisions for the child with whom she may be fighting to
preserve a relationship?
Client-directed advocacy does not mean that the attorney must
simply accept the client’s direction without question. Attorneys may engage
the client in a discussion about the client’s goals and whether those goals
serve the client’s best interests. Model Rule 2.1 provides that attorneys
“shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.
In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
118
Id. Similarly, in the context of relinquishment, courts have observed that youth and poverty do
not raise a presumption of duress. T.R. v. Adoption Servs., Inc., 724 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding youth and poverty do not constitute duress in securing relinquishment of child for
adoption).
119
Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the "Right" Thing to Do, 27 PACE L.
REV. 869, 902-05 (2007).
120
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, 1–2 ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE § 2.08 (2000).
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may be relevant to the client’s situation.”121 In fact, if the client is taking
actions that will be substantially detrimental, it would seem that a competent
attorney would be required to provide this advice. Just as an attorney for a
corporation or other entity under Rule 1.13 must ask his client to reconsider
actions that would substantially harm the client,122 so too the attorney’s
duties as an advisor under Rule 2.1 and the duties of communication under
Rule 1.4123 combine to provide a similar duty to counsel and communicate
with the child client.
However, to what extent can child-clients actually direct a
representation? Increasing understanding of brain science tells us that
teenagers reason differently than adults. These differences have been cited
to limit adolescent culpability and also their rights.124 However, research
also indicates that, when guided by caring and competent adults, adolescents
can make critical decisions for themselves and their children.125 Attorneys
representing children should not rush to conclusions about capacity based on
limited information or assumptions based on age or upon the degree to
which the attorney agrees with the client’s decisions. “A great danger in
capacity assessment is that eccentricities, aberrant character traits, or risktaking decisions will be confused with incapacity. A capacity assessment
first asks what kind of person is being assessed and what sorts of things that
person has generally held to be important.”126 Comments to Model Rule
1.14 provide additional guidance for making an assessment of competency:
In determining the extent of the client’s diminished
capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such
factors as: the client’s ability to articulate reason leading to
a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to
appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive
fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with
the known long-term commitments and values of the client.
In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance
from an appropriate diagnostician.127

121

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2010).
123
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010).
124
Buss, supra note 109, at 811.
125
Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment
in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 770 (2002) (“There is no set of findings that
suggests that most children under the age of eighteen lack the capacity to make these [medical care]
decisions. In fact, evidence suggests that some minors gain the requisite capacity considerably before
reaching adulthood.”); see also J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening
to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 61, 145 (2003).
126
Charles P. Sabatino, Representing a Client with Diminished Capacity: How Do You Know It and
What Do You Do About It? 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 481, 486 (2000).
127
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14, cmt 6 (2010).
122
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Assessing the capacity of any client requires time. Multiple
meetings over time also allow an attorney to see temporal variations in
functioning,128 which can facilitate evaluating competency. Competency is
not an on-off switch but a spectrum and the attorney should always strive to
facilitate the client’s decision-making in those circumstances in which the
client has capacity. This facilitation cannot happen without a relationship
with the client, and this is especially so with children. Only by
understanding the child-parent’s values, beliefs, and habits can the attorney
counsel the child effectively.
Unless the attorney believes the child-client is simply incapable of
providing direction to the representation, the child should be empowered to
direct the representation. In addition to the due process and ethical
considerations that point to this approach, the practical reality of the lives of
teen parents necessitates this approach.
There is also a pragmatic reason for attorneys representing
teens to advocate for their clients’ expressed interests. As
social workers in the field sometimes put it, “teenagers can
walk.” Adolescents easily and readily defy decisions made
by their attorneys or by the court. Unlike infants and small
children, they can run away from placements, refuse to
attend visits with parents or siblings, and fail to keep
counseling appointments scheduled by others. Given that a
teenager has sufficient autonomy to disregard court and
agency decisions regarding her care, an attorney who wants
to ensure compliance with court orders has no choice but to
enlist her client’s active participation in setting the goals of
representation.129
This observation requires attorneys to recognize that, regardless of
whether the teen parent is a mature decision maker, they are in fact making
decisions and have the power to act on those decisions. Whether serving as
a GAL or as an attorney for the child, the best interest of a teen parent is
representation that empowers the client to make wise decisions. To
facilitate that decision-making, the attorney must provide independent
professional judgment designed to protect the legal rights and powers of the
child free from prejudgment.
D. Involving Other Adults in the Teen Parent’s Decision-making
Rule 1.14 allows attorneys to involve other family members in
decision-making when a client’s capacity to make decisions is limited.130
128
129
130
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Research indicates that involvement of adults with teen parents improves
decision-making and outcomes. In fact, one of the most important variables
in determining whether a teen mother will become the respondent in an
abuse and neglect action tends to be her living situation. Adolescent
mothers living with an adult relative were much less likely to have their
children removed for abuse and neglect than those who were not living with
an adult relative.131
Once a child is involved in the child welfare system, however, an
attorney must take great care in assessing the degree to which involvement
of other adults in counseling the child client will enhance or diminish the
client’s decision-making. If the client insists on having family members
present for meetings, attorneys must be aware of the interactions among the
family members. They should “note any indication of discomfort by the
client or influence by the younger family member . . . the content and tenor
of comments, how supportive or dominating the family member may be, and
how consistent or inconsistent the client’s stated objectives are with prior
wishes.”132 If an attorney believes a family member is interfering with his
client’s decision-making, the attorney may take steps to limit that
interference.
If an attorney believes that the client’s capacity to act in his or her
own best interest is diminished and the client is at risk of harm, the attorney
may, under Rule 1.14 and its state counterparts, take “reasonably necessary
protective action.”133 This can include revealing confidential information in
order to consult with others or even, in the most extreme cases, seeing
appointment of a guardian or conservator. “The appointment of a guardian
is a serious deprivation of the client’s rights and ought not to be undertaken
if other, less drastic, solutions are available.”134 Given the negative effect of
implying the teen parent is incapable of directing the representation, the
attorney should proceed with caution.135 An attorney in these circumstances
should take great care to remember that the fundamental duty is to maintain
a normal attorney-client relationship as much as is reasonably possible.
This means the attorney will consider and respect the teen parent client’s
autonomy, dignity, and privacy when exercising this discretion to take steps
to assist the client.

131
Patricia Flanagan et al., Predicting Maltreatment of Children of Teenage Mothers, 149
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 451-55 (1995).
132
Aspirational Standards for the Practice of Elder Law with Commentaries, PROFESSIONALISM
AND ETHICS COMM. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF ELDER LAW ATT’S 9 (November 21, 2005),
http://www.naela.org/pdffiles/AspirationalStandards.pdf.
133
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2010).
134
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 404 (1996).
135
See Leslie J. Harris et al., Guardians Ad Litem for Parents in Dependency and TPR Cases, THE
OR. CHILD ADVOCACY PROJECT, 2 (Oct. 2008), http://familylaw.uoregon.edu/docs/ethicsmemo.pdf.
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E. The Problem of Bias and Appreciating the Client’s Worldview
Bias in the child welfare protection system has been a topic of
continued debate and study, as research indicates that poverty and race both
place parents at greater risk of state intervention.136 Advocates for teen
parents should be aware of their own biases and those built into the child
protection system: biases that judge these parents from the perspective of a
paradigm that says that one must delay childbearing until one is
economically and educationally prepared to provide adequate care for that
child. The choice to have a child during adolescence presumes that there is
a choice available to these youth or that any child who exercises this choice
to bear a child is doing so for unworthy reasons.
Poor youth are driven by a logic that is profoundly
counterintuitive to their middle-class critics, who sometimes
assume that poor women have children in a twisted
competition with their peers to gain status, because they
have an insufficient knowledge of—or access to—birth
control, or so they can milk the welfare system.137
Yet in an economy and society in which poor women with little
educational attachment have few opportunities for employment or stable
family structures, the choice to have a child is not illogical or evil. These
women rely on their children to bring validation, purpose, companionship,
and order to their often chaotic lives—things they find hard to come by in
other ways.138
This desire for a close familial bond is constitutionally protected.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that a parent’s interest in
relationships with his child is not merely one in which the parent has the
right to direct or control the child’s upbringing, but also an interest in the
emotional relationship—the “companionship” of their children.139

136
Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the
Child Protection System, 48 S.C.L. REV. 577, 584 (1997) (arguing that the increased exposure of poor
families exposes them to increased scrutiny of government actors); NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF
SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 76-77 (1997) (arguing that there is an inherent bias against poor and single
parent families in the legal system).
137
KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 171 (2005).
138
See infra text accompanying notes 144-148.
139
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (recognizing as fundamental “the interest of a parent
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children . . .”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that
the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children
‘come(s) to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.’” (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
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Yet it is difficult to overcome the assumptions that children having
children is a bad idea and that the best result for young people who do have
children—for both them and their children—is to sever that relationship and
free them to pursue education and employment opportunities. When study
after study indicates that teen parents and their children are at significant
risk for negative economic, educational, and health outcomes,140 doesn’t it
make sense that the best goal for any teen parent would be to relinquish their
child? Emily Buss has most clearly stated the argument for such a
presumption:
While a bright line rule that all parents below a certain age
are unfit will strike many, again, as inappropriate,
identifying age as a factor to be considered along with
others ought to be politically palatable. A statute might
provide, for example, that the age of a minor could be
viewed as an aggravating factor where another ground for
unfitness were established. Or a parent’s young age might
be identified as relevant to a calculation of the likely speed
of improvement in parenting. The youngest parents can be
expected to take the longest to improve their parenting
abilities and commitment, and on this ground should be
most vulnerable to the termination of their rights.141
Despite the arguments for these approaches, the current law does
not permit decisions on parental rights to be based on categorical
presumptions. The question advocates must continually press decisionmakers to ask is not whether teenage parenting is a good choice, but whether
this teen, who already is a parent, is a fit parent. The client’s situation must
be assessed individually, without prejudging the capacity of a minor to be a
fit parent. The United States Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Illinois,142 found
unconstitutional a law that presumed unwed fathers to be unfit parents
without an individual hearing. The court stated:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the
procedure forecloses the determinative issues of
competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present
realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks
running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.143

140
John Calvin et al., Decision-making Rights of Teen Parents, 12 MICH. CHILD WELFARE J. 29, 3233 (2009).
141
Buss, supra note 109, at 816.
142
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
143
Id. at 656-57.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol36/iss3/6

2011]

CHALLENGES IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS

333

The idea that terminating rights of minor parents is a positive for
both parent and child is grounded in a number of assumptions for which
there is little support. There is no clear evidence that punishing teen parents
for making the choice to conceive a child before they are in a better position
to care for the child will deter early childbearing. Moreover, there is little
evidence that children whose parents voluntarily relinquish their children
fare better than those who are raised by their teen parents. Despite
economic and educational disadvantages, both teen parents and their
children may be afforded important benefits from keeping their family
intact. Removal of a child from his parent has significant negative
consequences that “may be every bit as damaging to a child’s psyche as
harm caused by neglect.”144 For children, the foster care system is not ideal
and adoption is not guaranteed. Moreover, even for children who are
adopted, identity issues from adoption can create a lifetime of struggle.145
For many teen parents, especially those from poor communities,
having a child is a critical aspect of their own self-worth and identity.
Research has indicated that, in the poorest Latino communities in the United
States, childbearing gives girls self-worth and a feeling of respect.146
Ambivalence in Latino communities toward contraception and a bias against
abortion influences adolescent pregnancy rates.147
In an America that is profoundly unequal, the poor and rich
alike are supposed to wait to bear children until they can
complete their schooling, find stable employment, and
marry a man who has done the same. Yet poor women
realize they may never have children if they hold to this
standard. Middle-class taxpayers see the children born to a
young, poor, and unmarried mother as barriers to her future
achievement, shortcircuiting her chances for what might
have been a better life, while the mother herself sees
children as the best of what life offers.148
From the standpoint of the child’s legal rights, the termination of
her parental rights has profound consequences for her future ability to
parent. Many low skill job opportunities—child care and medical assisting,
for example—which may be the most available options for some of these
young people, are likely to be foreclosed to individuals who have had
parental rights terminated. Additionally, under the Adoption and Safe
144

Turcios, supra note 39, at 20.
Samuels, supra note 72, at 530-31 (reciting the psychological studies of adopted children, noting
their “unique developmental challenges” and their “increased risk for psychological and academic
problems”).
146
James Blair, Why Latinas are More Likely to be Moms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 28, 1999,
at 1.
147
Id. at 3.
148
EDIN, supra note 137, at 170.
145

Published by eCommons, 2010

334

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

Families Act, a parent who has had her rights terminated as to one child is
not entitled to “reasonable efforts” by the state agency to prevent removal of
another child.149 This rule has been criticized as unfairly burdening a parent
who “has instituted major positive changes in their life between the first
involuntary termination of the child and subsequent court proceedings
involving another child.”150 This criticism seems especially relevant to the
termination of a teen parent’s rights and explains why many state courts will
retain jurisdiction over a teen parent’s child for a longer period of time,
while delaying actions to terminate the rights of adolescent parents.
None of this is to say that an attorney should not counsel his teen
parent client regarding options of voluntary termination or less drastic steps,
such as a guardianship. Certainly an attorney should always provide a client
with options and the advantages and disadvantages of each.151 But that
counseling should be respectful of the client’s culture, values, and the reality
of their individual circumstances.
Probably the most important role an attorney for a teen parent can
play is to ensure that the system provides adequate services to give the teen
a reasonable choice and chance to succeed as a parent. “Effective programs
are systematically planned, offer a comprehensive selection of services,
address child development and health-care needs, are customized to the
parent’s developmental level, involve extended family members, and
promote intergenerational relationships.”152 In representing children with
special needs in the educational setting, schools are required to provide
individualized education plans to ensure that those children have a chance to
succeed. It seems most appropriate that the child welfare system should
approach adolescent parents who seek to maintain their parental rights as
similarly requiring individualized parenting plans—services and resources
to help them succeed.
What are the elements of such an individualized plan? Attorneys
should ensure that their clients have opportunities for effective counseling.
“[A]s many as 48% of adolescent mothers experience depressive symptoms,
compared to 13% of adult mothers.”153 Depressive symptoms in teens

149
See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116-17
(1997) (reasonable efforts are not required where “the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been
terminated involuntarily”).
150
See, e.g., In re Div. of Family Servs. v. Smith, 896 A.2d 179, 189 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2005); State v.
Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
151
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2010).
152
Child Welfare Information Gateway, Specialized Services for Young Parents, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., http://www.childwelfare.gov/famcentered/services/youngparents.cfm (last vistited
May 21, 2011).
153
Donna A. Clemmens, Adolescent Mothers’ Depression After the Birth of Their Babies:
Weathering the Storm, 37 ADOLESCENCE 147, 551 (2002).
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following birth increase the risk of subsequent pregnancy.154 If the
community provides home nurse visits and parenting educators, these
programs are very effective in mitigating the negative outcomes for teen
parents and their children, especially when they include clear and direct
instruction regarding effective birth control practices. Studies of these
programs indicate that they result in fewer subsequent teen pregnancies,
decreased welfare dependence, increased rates of employment, and
improved health outcomes for the children, including reduced rates of child
abuse.155
Perhaps one of the most important effects of these programs is to
reduce the likelihood of the teen parent having a second child before they
reach adulthood. “Repeat births represent more than one in five births to
teenagers . . . .”156 “Almost one in three women whose first birth occurred
before age 17 has a second birth within 24 months.”157 Most of these young
mothers say they did not want to become pregnant again so soon.158
[Research] shows that teenagers who have subsequent
births—particularly closely spaced births—are less likely to
obtain a high school diploma, and are more likely to live in
poverty or receive welfare, than those who have only one
child during adolescence. The risks of low birth weight and
poor health outcome also increase for babies born to
teenagers who already have a child, and these children may
also be more likely to suffer from child abuse or to be
placed in foster care. Finally, the public costs of caring for
many of these families are significant.159
Attorneys representing adolescent parents in the dependency actions
must be aware of the resources available to their clients for family planning
and contraception.160 They must continually search for and insist on the
availability of these and other resources for their clients and be willing to
assist the client in obtaining these resources. If attorneys are unwilling or
154
Diana Mahoney, Depression and Repeat Pregnancy in Teen Mothers, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
NEWS (Apr. 2008), http://www.clinicalpsychiatrynews.com/views/prevention-in-action-by-dr-carl-c-bell/
blog/depression-and-repeat-pregnancy-in-teen-mothers/114bf249ea.html.
155
Cynthia Dailard, Reviving Interest in Policies and Programs to Help Teens Prevent Repeat
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unable to provide this counsel to their teen parent clients, they should have
social work professionals available to whom they can refer their clients
without endangering the client’s legal rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Attorneys representing minor parents play an important role in the
child welfare system. Given the teen parent’s netherworld between
protected and prosecuted, between child and adult, their best interest is to
have the right to direct their attorney’s representation. There are significant
headwinds of age, race, and poverty that make it easy to assume that these
parents are unfit. There are plenty of players in the system willing to judge
the wisdom of these adolescents’ decisions. Only the child’s attorney is
there to protect their right to make those decisions and to insist on the
process they are due. Attorneys representing these clients should advocate
for client-directed representation, strive to clarify and protect the child’s
legal rights, press for individualized decision-making regarding the choice
to keep or relinquish their child, fight against decisions based on biased
presumptions of unfitness, and work toward a plan of services that can
support the teen’s development as a responsible parent.
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